INTRODUCTION
The IDEA 1 has revolutionized the way children with disabilities are educated in the United States. A unique statutory scheme requiring public schools to open their doors to children with disabilities, the IDEA rejected a one-size-fits-all concept of education and armed families with an unprecedented right to an education. 2 † J.D., LL.M., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I am fortunate to have had balance in my life among pursuit of professional aspiration, intellectual development, attending to a marriage and building a family. Joe, Allison, Laura and my entire extended family, you are the most meaningful dimension of my life. Many thanks to Professor Kate Shaw of Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law for encouragement and sound guidance in the development of this Article and the entire staff of Partnership for Children's Rights. To the CUNY Law Review board, thanks for your enthusiasm for bringing attention to special education issues in academia.
1 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § § 1400-1482 (2012) (referred to throughout as "the IDEA" or "the Act").
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CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:195 [Vol. 17:195 In general, parents who reject an IEP may select an alternative placement and proceed against the school district for tuition reimbursement. 12 Though the IDEA plainly specifies that the IEP serve as a written statement of, among other things, the services the school will provide to the child, an open issue is whether contract law concepts should be called upon in this area of jurisprudence. 13 The recent case of R.E. v. New York City Department of Education, 14 decided in September 2012, expressly addressed this issue. The case consolidated the claims of three different families. The families had asserted that their children's IEPs failed to include services necessary to an educational program for their children that could meet the IDEA's requirements. One of the issues addressed concerned whether school district testimony about how those very services-which were not described in the respective children's IEPs-would have been provided had the children enrolled in the public program. 15 Thus, the court was presented with the issue of whether the sufficiency of an IEP is to be judged exclusively by reference to the writing, or whether to consider testimony given after formulation of an IEP about how a child might have been given supports and services that were not otherwise provided for in the written document. The Second Circuit rejected a rule that would have restricted evaluation of the offered education to an IEP document, but stated that after-the-fact testimony could not be offered to remedy an otherwise defective IEP.
To place the discussion in perspective, this Article will first dis-XIV of the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education Hearing Rules for Special Education. See 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 28.08(6). 12 20 U.S.C. § § 1412, 1415(a)(10)(C)(iii). 13 Congress did not intend for the IEP to be a contract between parent and school or a guarantee of any particular outcome; instead, the writing was to "ensure adequate involvement" of the parent and child. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 11-12 (1975) , available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED112561.pdf. The Senate Committee further recognized that outcomes could not be guaranteed, but that the written plan would "emphasize the process of parent and child involvement and . . . create a written record of reasonable expectations." Id. The statutory requirement of a writing is not "merely technical"; instead, it creates "a clear record of the educational placement and other services offered to the parents." Knable v. Bexley Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994)).
14 R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2802 (2013) . In this Article, the New York City Department of Education will be referred to as the DOE. 15 Id. at 185. The court also considered the level of deference to be accorded to administrative decisions in the IDEA context and whether failure to strictly adhere to state regulations constitutes a per se IDEA violation. See id. at 188-90. This Article evaluates the court's decision relative to retrospective testimony only.
cuss the IDEA's history, with special attention to the legislative history as it pertains to the intended legal function of the IEP. The next section will discuss the current IDEA statutory framework, also focusing primarily on IEP formulation and content requirements and provisions for dispute resolution procedures. The R.E. decision will then be discussed in detail. Finally, the Article will analyze the legal import courts should confer upon the IEP document, taking into consideration legislative intent and additional case law.
The fuzzy terminology in the IDEA has impeded the efficacy of the IEP as a protective device. Notwithstanding provisions for administrative procedures to resolve disputes between families and school districts, 16 the IDEA, in fact, has blunt teeth. 17 This Article will argue that courts should recognize IEPs as quasi-contracts and apply contract law concepts to IEP disputes. Alternatively, Congress should rephrase its characterization of the IEP, calling it-at a minimum-a written agreement. This appellation would promote the IDEA's normative values, recognize the descriptive constructs that have developed over the thirty years of the IDEA's existence, 18 and empower and protect parents of children with disabilities.
I. HISTORY OF THE IDEA
Prior to the 1960s, exclusion of people with disabilities from mainstream education was accepted and even upheld. 19 In fact, at that time, special education was reserved for students with behavioral problems. The physically or intellectually disabled were barred from mainstream schools, as well. 20 The 1960s ushered in an overall progressive societal shift. A movement emerged that was bent on eradicating political structures that marginalized minorities and the poor, with the objective of opening the doors of opportunity to all. Education did not escape this shift. 16 20 U.S.C. §1415(b)(6)(A). 17 See Daniel, supra note 5. 18 See Caruso, supra note 4, at 175-76. ("The use of contractual jargon makes and is designed to make a powerful impression upon both parents and school district personnel . . . IEPs are referred to as contracts; therefore parents are led to believe they must be different. Administrators also share the sense that a contract is a higher, more immediate and accountable form of commitment toward children with disabilities than their generic duty to implement state and federal laws . . . an IEP is not a contract in a formal sense.") 19 See Romberg, supra note 2, at 421-22 (citing Kotler, supra note 4, at 343); Ferster, supra note 8, at 77; Daniel, supra note 5, at 5. See also Levine v. State Dep't of Insts. & Agencies, 84 N.J. 234 (1980) (stating that the constitutional right to an education does not extend to children classified as "subtrainable"). 20 Knight, supra note 2, at 378; Melvin, supra note 2, at 603-04.
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CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:195 Brown v. Board of Education 21 addressed the inequities of educational systems that segregated black children, holding that separate educational facilities were inherently unequal and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 In Brown, the Supreme Court noted the importance of education to society, stating:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
23
Brown also introduced a conceptual tension between education as an exclusively local service as opposed to a broader matter implicating constitutional rights and served to encourage people with disabilities to seek parity. THEORY TO THE IEP  201 handicapped children. 26 The Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) was enacted in 1970, and continued the grant for development of programs for students with disabilities by the states, but set neither substantive educational standards nor procedural requirements.
2013]

APPLYING CONTRACT
27
In this atmosphere, parents of children with disabilities sought to effect radical social change in the direction of inclusion. 28 The seeds of what ultimately became the IDEA are attributed to two cases, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (P.A.R.C.) and Mills v. Board of Education of D.C. (Mills) . 29 The courts in these two cases held that due process and equal protection under the United States Constitution require what have become the basic articles of faith in special education: where a state has undertaken to educate its children, children with disabilities living within the state are entitled to a free, appropriate education in public schools that meets their individual needs and capacities; that states have an obligation to identify children with disabilities; and that parents are entitled to involvement in decision-making and can seek to enforce their children's rights. 30 The germs of the phrase "free and appropriate public education," now firmly entrenched in the law of special education, are found in the P.A.R.C. decree. 31 Other elements of the P.A.R.C. See also Romberg, supra, note 2, at 422-24 (noting that after the decisions in P.A.R.C. and Mills, Congress enacted the EAHCA, incorporating "many of the robust procedural rights granted to disabled children" in those decisions); Knight, supra note 2, at 379 (noting that these two landmark cases signaled the advent of change); Engel, supra note 4, at 171-73 (noting that the EHA adopted the use of procedural protections to promote the legal rights of children with disabilities); Brizuela, supra note 2, at 598-600 ("P.A.R.C. and Mills established the principle that students with disabilities are entitled to a FAPE."). See also Daniel, supra note 5, at 6 (noting the "sordid history" of parental exclusion from educational decision-making until the advent of P.A.R.C. and Mills, as well as persistence of other advocates, leading to the ESEA's enactment). 30 See Knight, supra note 2, at 379; Brizuela, supra note 2, at 598-600; Engel, supra note 4, at 171-73.
31 P.A.R.C., 334 F. Supp. at 1266. The consent decree obligated Pennsylvania to provide a "free public education of education and training appropriate to [the child's] learning capacities" to the mentally retarded and "exceptional" children. Pennsylvania was further barred from applying statutes denying exceptional children access to public education and was charged with developing programs to educate
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[Vol. 17:195 cree that were ultimately incorporated into the IDEA were the concept of notice and a parental due process right concerning educational decisions, biennial evaluations and reimbursement of private school tuition if the public school could not accommodate the child's learning needs.
32
Plaintiffs in Mills 33 also asserted that they were deprived of their due process rights when their exceptional children were excluded from the public general education school system without hearings. Some were intellectually disabled and others had behavioral problems resulting from hyperactivity or emotional disturbance. The District of Columbia ultimately conceded its obligation to provide education suited to the respective needs of the individual plaintiffs and entered into a consent decree that it then failed to implement. Summary judgment was ultimately entered enforcing the Mills decree.
34
By granting summary judgment enforcing the decree, the court extended the Brown 35 principle of education as a civil right; excluding exceptional students from compulsory education was tantamount to segregation and rose to the level of a deprivation of due process, contravening the Fifth Amendment. 36 The decree in Mills required staffing of a special education department, an identification component, a due process and hearing procedure, and individual plans for each child. 37 The prospect of educational benefit, a precursor of the Rowley 38 standard, was another factor to be considered in determining a child's educational placement under the Mills decree.
39
The final decree in Mills required the District of Columbia to provide any child with "a free and suitable publicly-supported education regardless of the degree of the child's mental, physical or exceptional children. Notice to the affected class was also mandated. Mills also enumerated what would become the IDEA's procedural foundations and the elements of the IEP. Specifically, all students were to be "provided with a publicly-supported educational program suited to his needs" and parents were to be notified of the proposed program, with an opportunity to have a hearing if they found the proposal objectionable. 43 Notice of the program had to be in writing and the notice had to advise the parent of their right to object. 44 Though P.A.R.C. and Mills established a public obligation to educate children with disabilities, no supportive statute existed. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibited discrimination on the basis of disability, but did not mandate inclusion of children with disabilities in public school or expressly address the educational needs of those children. 45 Congress held additional hearings exam- 40 Id. 41 Id. at 879. 42 The IDEA defines a child with disabilities as a child with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this chapter as 'emotional disturbance'), orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012). Children ages 3 through 9 are considered disabled if they experience developmental delays, as defined by the State and as measured by appropriate diagnostic instruments and procedures, in [one] or more of the following areas: physical development; cognitive development; communication development; social or emotional development; or adaptive development . . . who, by reason thereof, need[ ] special education and related services.
Id. § 1401(3)(B).
43 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878-80. 44 Id. at 880-81. Mills also placed the burden upon the school district to establish the sufficiency of the offered educational program. As in the current state of the law, the Mills decree gave parents the right to cross-examine a school district's witnesses and to present their own witnesses. Id.
45 See Knight, supra note 2, at 381; WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 294.
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CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:195 ining the status of children with disabilities in education, resulting in the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) 46 in November of 1975. The EAHCA incorporated the elements articulated in P.A.R.C. and Mills, conferring a legal right to a free, appropriate education and, in effect, codified the holdings of those cases and afforded parents a means of enforcement. 47 The primary objective of the law was to guarantee parents a say in their children's education and to foster the collaborative process. 48 The lynchpin of the EAHCA was a prescribed meeting between parents and school districts at which an "individualized education program" would be planned and developed. From the outset, the IEP had to be formulated by the beginning of the school year, 49 and the formulation needed to be in writing. 50 However, the Senate Committee that considered the EAHCA explicitly stated in its report to the Senate: "It is not the Committee's intention that the written statement developed at the individual planning conferences be construed as creating a contractual relationship." That Act added important new provisions to the Education of the Handicapped Act which require the States to: establish a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped children; provide procedures for insuring that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards in decisions regarding identification, evaluation, and educational placement of handicapped children; establish procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not handicapped; and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the regular education environment occurs only when the nature of severity of the handicapped is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily . . . ." Id. 
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short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
52
The IEP team envisioned by the EAHCA was also simple: an IEP could be formulated in "any meeting" of "a representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child." 53 The EAHCA included procedural safeguards to protect parents. Educational agencies could not evaluate a child, change their classification or educational placement without first notifying the parent in writing. 54 The EAHCA also provided for an enforcement procedure, mandating states to develop administrative venues for resolving disputes under the Act and permitting appeals to either state or federal court. 55 The EAHCA resulted in an increase in the number of children receiving special education, but this progress was far from perfect, and the EAHCA was fine-tuned in successive amendments. 56 The 1990 amendments 57 introduced the name by which the Act is currently known-the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act or IDEA.
58
The IEP requirements remained unchanged until the 1997 52 59 in which the IEP requirements were greatly amplified. The 1997 amendments combined provisions referring to evaluations, reevaluation, and IEP development and review into section 614 and called for a more comprehensive, sophisticated IEP document. 60 The law introduced a nominal substantive educational standard; the plan had to foster advancement in "attaining the annual goals," as well as enable the child "to be involved and progress in the general curriculum."
61 Identification of the participants in the IEP team was also expanded. The team was now mandated to include the parents, teachers familiar with the child in the educational setting, and special education teachers or other specialists involved in addressing the child's special needs. 62 The 1997 amendments required that IEPs include measurable goals, benchmarks, and short-term objectives and specification of how progress would be reported to parents. 63 However, an overly rigid document was not envisioned by Congress; the need for "specific day-to-day adjustments" was acknowledged, but no adjustment mechanism was codified. 64 The last amendments of note were made in 2004. 65 The 2004 amendments further refined the IEP development process. 66 The Amendments added procedures that allowed the IEP to be a more 59 Pub. L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) . 60 See id. at 81, 86-88. The 1997 amendments also added 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C), predicating reimbursement of tuition for parents who unilaterally enroll their children in private schools upon notice to the school district. See id. at 63. See also Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009) (holding that reimbursement for the cost of private-school special education is authorized under the IDEA "when a school district fails to provide a [free appropriate public education] and the private-school placement is appropriate"). 61 111 Stat. at 84. 62 See id. at 85. 63 See id. at 83. 64 See S. REP. NO. 105-17, at 19-21 (1997), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/CRPT-105srpt17/pdf/CRPT-105srpt17.pdf ("Specific day-to-day adjustments in instructional methods and approaches that are made by either a regular or special education teacher to assist a disabled child to achieve his or her annual goals would not normally require action by the child's IEP team. However, if changes are contemplated in the child's measurable annual goals, benchmarks, or short term objectives, or in any of the services or program modifications, or other components described in the child's IEP, the [local educational agency] must ensure that the child's IEP team is reconvened in a timely manner to address those changes." Id. at 20. 67 States were permitted to apply to participate in a pilot, multi-year IEP program. 68 Parental participation in meetings by telephone or video conference was permitted and, with written consent from the parent, IEP team members whose areas would be unaffected by any IEP changes were excused from development meetings. 69 Unlike earlier versions, the current act emphasizes performance and advancement in alignment with the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. 70 Also, a qualitative element was added; the services provided must be "based on peer-reviewed research to the extent possible." 71 Overall, both the process of IEP development and the IEP document itself have increased in complexity since 1975.
Throughout its history, the IDEA required states to maintain an administrative procedure for resolution of disputes between parents and school districts. 72 Under this section, states are required to establish procedures for resolution of complaints concerning "identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child," including mediation. 73 Appeal may be taken from the administrative proceedings to state or federal court. 74 Written notification must be given to parents informing them of their procedural rights. 75 The IDEA has wrought remarkable change. Its procedures and procedural protections have evolved in complexity. However, the statute's primary mechanism, the IEP, is still referred to as merely a written statement, and this seriously undermines the potential for forceful protection for families of students with disabilities.
II. IEPS AND PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN THE CURRENT IDEA
At its most basic, the overall objective of the IDEA is to level the educational playing field for students with disabilities relative 208 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:195 to their peers without disabilities. 76 The ultimate aim is to provide these students with a better, long-term outcome in terms of productivity in adulthood. 77 The federal statute sets forth a mandate and prescribes structures to effectuate that mandate, but execution is accomplished at a very local level, with state oversight and federal support. 78 The IDEA's procedural structures also attempt to redress the imbalance of power between parents and school districts.
79
The overarching mandate of the IDEA is provision of a free and appropriate public education, or FAPE, to children who have been classified as disabled.
80 This is to be accomplished in the "least restrictive environment."
81 Specifically, the statute states:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
82
The statute proscribes four elements of a FAPE, namely an education with related services that have been a) provided at public expense; b) that meet state standards; c) delivered at an appropriate school in the state; and d) that are "provided in conformity with the individualized education program." 83 80 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). The substantive dimension of "appropriateness" is not specified in the statute and is instead provided by case law that will be discussed later in this section. 81 Id. § 1400(a)(5) (stating that funding allocations cannot "limit or condition the right of a child with a disability . . . to receive a free appropriate public education . . . in the least restrictive environment"). 82 Id. fers to the IEP as "a written statement" 84 setting forth exactly what will be provided in the educational sphere. Thus, the IEP is the cornerstone, expressing the deliverables and outcomes that constitute a FAPE for each particular child.
As for content, the IDEA currently requires that an IEP include an exhaustive description of the child from an academic and social-emotional perspective, as well as an explanation of how the child's disability impacts her education and social-emotional development, referred to as "present levels of performance." 85 It must describe the impact of the child's disability on her "involvement and progress in the curriculum." 86 A set of "measurable annual goals" must be included in the IEP, along with a statement of what supports, related services, aids and/or modifications will be provided to attain the specified goals.
87 Any decision to educate a student outside of the general population must be explained in the IEP. 88 The IEP must state its effective date, the frequency, location and duration of all services and include transition service plans starting at age fourteen with annual revision.
89
The statutory scheme emphasizes the rights and obligations of parents and school districts in the IEP formulation process and in 
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[Vol. 17:195 dispute resolution procedures. States must adopt procedures guaranteeing parents and children procedural safeguards, including a guarantee that parents be allowed to attend all meetings concerning, inter alia, the "educational placement of the child, and the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child."
90
The development of an IEP is supposed to be a collaborative process with a temporal element, within statutorily specified parameters. 91 Participants in the IEP development process must include the child's parents, at least one "regular education teacher" of the child, one special education teacher of the child, and a representative of the local educational agency, such as the school district. 92 The district's representative must have supervisory authority in regard to special education, must be knowledgeable about the general curriculum, and must have knowledge of the available resources. One member of the team must be able to interpret the "instructional implications of evaluation results." 93 Significantly, a sufficient IEP must be in effect by the beginning of the school year. 94 In New York, IEP teams are called the "committee on special education," or CSE. 95 Neither the IDEA nor its predecessor statute, the EAHCA, include language defining an "appropriate" education. Instead, this issue has been decided by the courts. Asserting the need for an in-class interpreter, her parents initiated an impartial hearing and did not prevail at the administrative level. Id. at 185. The district court, however, found that the disability was interfering with Amy's education. They looked to whether there was a disparity between the child's level of performance as compared to her potential. Id. at 185-86. The Second Circuit affirmed by a split panel. Id. at 186. Certiorari was granted specifically so that the Supreme Court could examine the substantive confines of a FAPE. The Supreme Court held that Amy had been provided with an appropriate education since she was provided with "personalized instruction and related services" meeting her personal needs and permitting her to advance from grade to grade. 
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Supreme Court provided guidance on the issue. After extensive examination of the legislative history, the Court, in a decision by Justice Rehnquist, found that the term "appropriate" did not require maximization of each child's potential. In fact, equal educational opportunity was rejected as an unworkable standard. 97 The standard set was minimal, relying on legislative history indicating that FAPE was to provide a "basic floor of opportunity" and that attaining grades sufficient to advance generally is indicative of "educational benefit."
98 However, the Court stated that the education must be personalized, provide supports and services, and "must comport with the child's IEP."
99 Qualitatively, the Court concluded that the education must enable the child to make progress and not induce regression.
100
States must establish procedures for parents to contest "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child," 101 with a two year limitations period.
102
There are ample opportunities for parents and school districts to resolve their differences before relief is pursued through the administrative process. Under the IDEA, a parent who rejects the IEP and wishes to enroll their child in a private school must provide ten days' notice prior to the withdrawal, to which the school district may respond.
103
been provided with a FAPE through an IEP permitting her educational opportunity but argued for a strict standard affording greater deference to the administrative hearing officers. Id. at 210-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The dissent of Justices White, Brennan and Marshall argued that the statute's objective was to provide "full educational opportunity" and noted that, without a sign language interpreter, Amy comprehended "less than half of what [was] said in the classroom -less than half of what normal children comprehend. This is hardly an equal opportunity to learn, even if Amy makes passing grades." Id. at 213-16 (White, J., dissenting). 97 Id. at 198-200. 98 Justice White's dissent, which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, asserts that the "basic floor of opportunity" contemplated by Congress was one that eliminated "the effects of the handicap" to the extent possible. New York has established a two-tiered administrative hearing process along the continuum embraced by the IDEA; parents may file an administrative complaint 104 "with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student." 105 A thirty-day resolution period follows. 106 If the dispute is not resolved during that time, an impartial hearing is held before a hearing officer and mediation is available as an alternative. 107 At the hearing, witnesses testify under oath and other evidence may also be received. 108 In New York, "any party aggrieved" by the Impartial Hearing Officer's decision may appeal to the State Review Officer (SRO). 109 The SRO's review is based upon the appellate pleadings and the impartial hearing record and the SRO may ask the parties to present oral argument or additional evidence beyond the impartial hearing record. 110 The decisions of the State Review Officer are appealable to either New York State Supreme Court or federal district court. 111 
School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts
112 established the standard for determining whether a parent who rejects an IEP and unilaterally places their child in private school is entitled to tuition reimbursement. In Burlington, the Supreme Court held that courts have the latitude to award tuition reimbursement "where a court determines that a private placement desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an IEP calling for placement in a public school was inappropriate." 113 The Court also stated "equitable considerations are
2013]
APPLYING CONTRACT THEORY TO THE IEP 213 relevant in fashioning appropriate relief." 114 Subsequently, this decision gave rise to the three-pronged Burlington test, which considers: (1) whether the school district offered an appropriate program in the IEP; (2) whether the alternative selected by the parents was appropriate; and (3) whether the equities favor the parents. 115 The IDEA provides that if a parent enrolls their child in a private school without consent from a public agency, then a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment.
116
Reimbursement may be "reduced or denied" if the parent fails to object to the education offered in the IEP at the IEP formulation meeting or fails to provide written notice of the basis for their objections to the IEP within ten business days prior to enrolling their child in a private school. 117 Reimbursement of private school tuition may also be reduced or denied if the parent has been notified that the district intends to evaluate the child or "upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to actions taken by the parents." 118 The initial inquiry, however, is always whether the public educational authority offered a FAPE in the first instance.
Where a child has been identified as having a qualifying disability, the logical starting point of the determination of whether a FAPE has been offered should be the IEP. However, as reflected in the R.E. case, school districts have been known to offer testimony about how a child might be provided with services not reflected within the IEP document.
119 R.E. purports to resolve the issue of whether the determination is restricted to the information con- . 2012 ). In addition, the statute provides that, after consideration of "a preponderance of the evidence" a court "shall grant such relief as it determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
116 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). This is so even if the student was never classified as disabled under the IDEA nor received special education services in the public school. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 237-39 (citing Burlington in noting that parents are entitled to tuition reimbursement where they had provided school district with independent evaluations and the school district's refusal to provide an IEP deprived plaintiff of a FAPE).
117 20 U.S.C. § 1412(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb).
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CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:195 tained within the four corners of the IEP document only. 120 III. R.E. V. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: DISCUSSION R.E. is comprised of three companion cases brought by parents of autistic children. All three cases were ultimately appealed to the Second Circuit. In each case, the plaintiff parents claimed that the IEPs created by the New York City Department of Education (DOE) were deficient and failed to offer all of the services necessary to meet the complainant children's educational needs. Instead of placing their children in public schools, the plaintiff parents opted, providing the requisite notice, to place them in private schools.
121 Each of the children involved attended private schools specializing in working with autistic children. The cost of providing specialized education is extremely high, and some tuitions ran into six figures.
122 Parents of these children challenged the IEPs in administrative hearings, claiming that they did not comply with the IDEA's requirements of offering a FAPE. The DOE offered testimony explaining how the children's needs would have been met, even though the services described in the verbal testimony did not appear in the written IEPs.
A. Facts and Procedural History of the Companion Cases
At issue in the lead case was the IEP developed for the 2008-2009 school year for J.E., an autistic child. The challenged IEP offered placement in a 6:1:1 special class and a full-time, behavior-management paraprofessional, as well as two 30-minute ses- 120 Id. at 185. 121 Id. at 175-84. New York City has a bifurcated IEP development and school placement process. In addition to parents, IEP development teams include administrators responsible for the various zones within the DOE's purview in addition to the other required IEP team members. 
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sions of group counseling each week with the following related services: five 30-minute individual sessions of speech therapy and five 30-minute occupational therapy sessions. 123 R.E. and M.E. rejected the IEP and enrolled their son in a private school, McCarton, specializing in teaching children with autism. 124 The parents notified the DOE that they objected to the offered program and placement because it did not provide the necessary 1:1 teaching instruction or sufficient speech therapy, 125 and that J.E. was being reenrolled in McCarton. The IHO found in favor of the parents. 128 The DOE appealed to the SRO, 129 who reversed and denied reimbursement, determining instead that the 6:1:1 class was appropriate. 130 The parents appealed and the district court reversed the SRO.
The district court held that the DOE had failed to offer a FAPE in the first instance and that the SRO erred in relying on "after-the-fact testimony of . . . what the teacher . . . would have done if J.E. had attended his class." 131 The district court noted "the only information the parents can rely upon as determining whether the proposed program is appropriate for their child is the IEP document itself." 132 The district court concluded that the SRO improperly relied on the teacher's testimony "to remedy deficits found by the IHO in the IEP." 135 The IEP noted R.K.'s need for constant supervision, but a Functional Behavioral Assessment (FBA) was not performed nor was a behavioral intervention plan (BIP) developed for inclusion in the IEP. 136 Nor did the IEP specify provision of parent training.
137
The parents objected to a lack of an FBA, a BIP or provision of parent training in the IEP. 138 They rejected the IEP as insufficient, enrolled their child at Brooklyn Autism Center (BAC) and initiated a due process hearing seeking tuition reimbursement. (2013) . New York regulations prescribe the methodology for conducting the assessment and specifies that the assessment should identify a baseline of the student's problem behaviors with regard to frequency, duration, intensity and/or latency across activities, settings, people and times of the day" and must permit formulation of a behavioral intervention plan. Id. § 200.22(a)(3). The code defines a behavioral intervention plan as a plan based upon an FBA that "at a minimum includes a description of the problem behavior, global and specific hypotheses as to why the problem behavior occurs and intervention strategies that include positive behavioral supports and services to address the behavior." Id. § 200.1(mmm). 137 The NYCRR states that "parent counseling and training means assisting parents in understanding the special needs of their child; providing parents with information about child development; and helping parents to acquire the necessary skills that will allow them to support the implementation of their child's individualized education program." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(kk). To the extent that parent training is provided, it must be specified in the IEP. Id. § 200.4(d)(2)(v)(b)(5). Parent training must be provided for parents of autistic children. Id. § 200.13(d) ("Provision shall be made for parent counseling and training . . . for the purpose of enabling parents to perform appropriate follow-up intervention activities at home.").
138 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *8. The IEP noted that R.K. engaged in self-stimulation, which interfered with her attention and social interaction, but concluded that her behavior could be addressed by the classroom teacher. See R.E., 694 F.3d at 179.
139 R.K., 2011 WL 1131492, at *1. Among other things, the parents claimed that the IEP's contents were deficient because the DOE failed to perform an FBA for development of a BIP; that mandated services of parent counseling, parent training, and speech and language therapy were either missing or insufficient; and that the 6:1:1 class ratio would not provide sufficient individualized attention. Id. at *8, 14-25. BAC is a school with five teachers serving four students using 1:1 ABA instruction; the school has students rotate among the teachers every thirty minutes and seeks to de-
218
CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:195 At the impartial hearing, the DOE offered testimony of R.K.'s proposed public school teacher. She testified about her teaching methodologies, how she would have provided attention to R.K., and how the speech and language therapy would be supplemented through daily classroom instruction. 140 The public school's parent coordinator testified that the school provided referrals to outside agencies, occasional workshops, and parent training on request.
141
The IHO ruled in favor of the parents, holding that the IEP was insufficient.
142
The DOE appealed and the SRO reversed, relying on the DOE testimony in the record of the impartial hearing to cure deficiencies in the IEP in regard to formulation of a BIP and provision of speech and language services. 143 Relying on hearing testimony of the school's parent coordinator about the availability of parent training services, the SRO determined that failure to list parent training and counseling as a related service in the IEP was immaterial. 144 Tuition reimbursement was denied completely, and the parents appealed to the district court.
The district court reversed the SRO's decision, granting summary judgment to the parents. 145 Significantly, the district court opined that DOE testimony could not cure deficiencies in the IEP. 146 The district court rejected the SRO's conclusion that R.K.'s behavior did not interfere with learning and criticized reliance velop "self-care, language skills, socialization, play skills, and pragmatic language." Id. at *9. Parents are required to come to the school for at least two hours monthly for training. Id. The DOE refused to consider BAC as a possible placement. upon the teacher's prospective testimony of how she would have developed a BIP once the child was in her classroom. 147 Nor could failure to identify parent training as a related service in the IEP be cured by DOE testimony about the availability of services at the proposed school. 148 The district court further held that the SRO erred in relying on testimony about classroom activities targeting speech and language skills to make up for deficient provisions for speech and language therapy in the IEP. 149 The court found that the hearing evidence supported a finding that a 6:1:1 class would not afford the attention R.K. required. 150 The district court concluded that the compounded omissions in the IEP constituted a denial of a FAPE and awarded tuition reimbursement.
151
Like the two other plaintiffs, the third plaintiff, E. Z.-L., was autistic and enrolled in a specialized private school. E. Z.-L.'s mother rejected the 2008-2009 IEP and offered placement in writing, stating her intent to enroll E. Z.-L. in The Rebecca School and to seek tuition reimbursement. 152 The parents then filed an Impartial Hearing request. 153 The issues in E. Z.-L's case, however, differed slightly from the companion cases. E. Z.-L. challenged the ability of the offered placement to implement the IEP and the failure to comply with New York regulations mandating conduct of an FBA in order to formulate a BIP. 154 The IHO found that E. Z.-L. was denied a FAPE
2013]
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should not be the sole benchmark in measuring whether the District had fulfilled its obligations under IDEA's substantive standards. 161 Instead, the DOE contended that testimony about what the child "would have received" in a public school setting, including testimony about services or accommodations not identified in the IEP, should be considered. The plaintiffs urged enunciation of a "four corners" rule, which would have limited the court's determination of IDEA compliance exclusively to examination of the sufficiency of the terms of the IEP. The court struck a balance, adhering to a middle ground:
[W]e hold that testimony regarding state-offered services may only explain or justify what is listed in the written IEP. Testimony may not support a modification that is materially different from the IEP, and thus a deficient IEP may not be effectively rehabilitated or amended after the fact through testimony regarding services that do not appear in the IEP.
162
The court was influenced by cases from the Ninth, Third, and First Circuits, all of which dealt with the issue of whether a child's progress or lack of progress may be considered in determining whether an IEP afforded a FAPE and concluded that past or present progress was irrelevant to the determination. 163 The Second Circuit found in these three cases a temporal dimension to the determination of an IEP's sufficiency, calling for examination of an IEP solely by reference to conditions known at the time the IEP was created. 164 Additionally, the court noted a trend of rejecting retro-
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165
Though the court declined to adopt a strict four-corners test, it nonetheless found in these cases a limitation permitting examination of the IEP document in determining whether a FAPE had been offered. Thus, the core holding of the R.E. decision is that "retrospective evidence" materially altering an IEP is not permissible.
166
The court properly acknowledged the centrality of the IEP. It noted that the IEP is the primary factor upon which parents base their decisions to enroll their child in a private or public program. 167 By barring testimony about delivery of services not included in the IEP, the decision promotes fairness in the IEP formulation process, admonishing districts not to engage in "bait and switch" tactics. However, application of the rule to each of the cases serves as a cautionary tale to parents and their attorneys to provide a clear record establishing their child's educational needs and that those needs have not been sufficiently met by the child's IEP. e therefore must not engage in Monday-morning quarterbacking guided by our knowledge of S.R.'s subsequent progress at Eagle Hill, but rather consider the propriety of the IEP with respect to the likelihood that it would benefit S.R. at the time it was devised.").
166 R.E., 694 F.3d at 188. Testimony from the proposed classroom teachers was deemed unreliable to justify the programs and services contained in an IEP, since placement with a particular teacher cannot be guaranteed at the time an IEP is drafted. Id. at 187. 167 Id. at 188. 168 Despite the correct result in this core holding, the R.E. court improperly stated that good-faith IEP errors and omissions could be remedied during the thirty-day resolution period that follows after a parent has filed a due process complaint, as required by 20 U.S.C. §1415(f)(1)(B). See R.E., 694 F.3d at 188. Permitting reformation of an otherwise deficient IEP-all under the guise of good faith-would be as improper as permitting the after-the-fact testimony barred by the R.E. decision. A motion for rehearing en banc on this issue was supported by an amicus brief filed by Partnership for Children's Rights, The Legal Aid Society, Advocates for Children of New York, New York Legal Assistance Group, Queens Legal Services, Legal Services NYC-Bronx, and Southern Bronx Legal Services. The amici argued that the resolution period exception carved out by the panel's decision contravenes the timeliness element of the IDEA's FAPE requirement and could be read to effect a new FAPE standard for private school tuition cases: FAPE may be offered either through an appropriate IEP prepared prior to the start of the school year (and prior to the student's enrollment in the private school) or through an IEP later modified to remedy the deficiencies, as long as the IEP modifications are made during the
